Decision Making as Output and Bounded Rationality

  The classical economics theories proceed on the assumption of rational agents. Rationality implies the economic agents undertake actions or exercise choices based on the cost-benefit analysis they undertake. The assumption further posits that there exists no information asymmetry and thus the agent is aware of all the costs and benefits associated with the choice he or she has exercised. The behavioral school contested the decision stating the decisions in practice are often irrational. Implied there is a continuous departure from rationality. Rationality in the views of the behavioral school is more an exception to the norm rather a rule. The past posts have discussed the limitations of this view by the behavioral school. Economics has often posited rationality in the context in which the choices are exercised rather than theoretical abstract view of rational action. Rational action in theory seems to be grounded in zero restraint situation yet in practice, there are numerous restra

The Mythology and the Separating Equilibrium


In game theory, separating equilibrium is a scenario wherein each player is forced to reveal his or her private information. In normal circumstances agents send out different signals for different contexts. The recipient would be served best if he or she are able to decode the true self of the messenger and the mess. Often, the hiding of private information and preferences by the agents is to enable them to counter posit the strategy of the rivals. Ideally, any strategy must be aimed to garner the private information and preferences of the agent. Implied is the true self of the agent must be revealed. For example to an insurance company the firm must be in a position to get the exact status of health information of the person doing the policy. The agent knowing a great deal of their health would obviously have incentives in hiding the information from the insurance company. For the firm, the ideal scenario is wherein, the agent has to reveal his or her true health status. The equilibrium arise out of self-selection.

Substantial literature in economics, strategy and game theory dealing with separating equilibrium exists, yet it is quite interesting to note the concept was not unusual in ancient times. Though the vocabulary might be new, many instances from mythology do point out our ancient ancestors were well versed with the concept of separating equilibrium. To them, it was the objective, talent and skill to make the agent reveal himself his true selves, preferences, information etc. Few examples from mythology would be in order to comprehend the same.

It was in Odysseus’ destiny to lead Greeks to victory in the Trojan War. Odysseus had been warned by an oracle that if he were to join Trojan War, he would be away from his family for many years. Knowing the pitfalls, he had decided to avoid going to the War. Yet there was a promise to be kept to King Agammemon of joining hands with him to rescue Helen of Troy. When Helen had chosen Agammemon, other kings and princes had promised to support Agammemon in case someone harms or attempted to harm Helen of Troy. So Odysseus had to keep his promise but only if he was sane. So Odysseus started to behave as a mad person when the messenger came asking him to betake himself to the war. He started ploughing at random times including at night and at random places. He began to sow salt instead of seed. So the messenger Palmedes had to test whether Odysseus was genuinely insane or pretending to be one. So a separating equilibrium scenario was needed and it was a month old son of Odysseus named Telemachus who proved to be one. Odysseus was emotionally bound to his son and so when Palmedes placed Telemachus in front of the plough, Odysseus did not plough over his son but skirted it. It would not be possible if it was genuine insane action therefore, the separating equilibrium saw Odysseus reveal his true self. Odysseus had to join the war.

Indian mythology too is replete with instances of separating equilibrium. Both Ramayana and Mahabharata provide instances of the same. The analysis will proceed on the swayamwara of both Sita and Draupadi. Rather just dispelling myths of patriarchy etc. the swayamwara show the freedom of choice of women in choosing their life partners as also scheme designed to create and nurture a separating equilibrium.

Sita’s swayamvara was designed to get Rama marry her. The bow was designed in such a way that only Rama could have lifted the bow and strung it. More interesting would be the swayamwara of Draupadi. After her father Draupada had been humiliated by Drona, he had conducted a yagna wherein he had prayed for a daughter who would marry Arjuna and son who would kill Drona. Post Khandavaprastha, it was believed Pandavas had been burnt alive. So, next alternative was someone equivalent to Arjuna. So the target and the method of hitting the target was chosen keeping Arjuna or his equivalent in mind. Only an archer of Arjuna’s calibre would be able to look the image of the target in plate of oil and shoot the bull’s eye. Arjuna along with other Pandavas had been present in the swayamwara disguised as Brahmins. After Kshatriyas failed, Brahmins were invited and Arjuna accepted the invitation and succeeded. Arjuna and Pandavas were re-discovered to be alive and what made that possible was Arjuna’s mastery and devotion to archery made him the bull’s eye without any trouble. Nothing better illustrates the same than this.

Bheema’s killing of Bakasura too would have revealed the true self of Pandavas yet they had an occasion to escape but Draupadi’s swayamwara was situation where escape was impossible. Killing Bakasura was subconscious separating equilibrium. The attempts by Kauravas was to created multiple separating equilibrium attempts to bring true selves of Pandavas during Agyantvasa or period of disguise. Keechaka’s killing was signal towards the same so was the battle with Arjuna and Uttara Kumar. The Kauravas’ argument was they had managed to make Pandavas reveal themselves but the situation was not conclusive fool proof revelation. The dispute over this ended with Pandava victory in the Kurukshetra War.

While the nomenclature and mathematical treatment might be new, the application has been enshrined in strategy and practice for thousands of years. The illustrations from mythology reinforce the same. In a universe of asymmetric information, each agent through signals sends out certain contextual messages and the recipient strategy would be to make the sender reveal the true preference or self.





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