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Showing posts with the label gamesmanship

Decision Making as Output and Bounded Rationality

  The classical economics theories proceed on the assumption of rational agents. Rationality implies the economic agents undertake actions or exercise choices based on the cost-benefit analysis they undertake. The assumption further posits that there exists no information asymmetry and thus the agent is aware of all the costs and benefits associated with the choice he or she has exercised. The behavioral school contested the decision stating the decisions in practice are often irrational. Implied there is a continuous departure from rationality. Rationality in the views of the behavioral school is more an exception to the norm rather a rule. The past posts have discussed the limitations of this view by the behavioral school. Economics has often posited rationality in the context in which the choices are exercised rather than theoretical abstract view of rational action. Rational action in theory seems to be grounded in zero restraint situation yet in practice, there are numerous restra

Corner or convex solutions –Mahabharata to Jinnah to Anna Hazare

Indifference analysis enables locating the optimal consumption bundle of typical consumer. Corner solutions are exception to law of equi-marginal utility. But do they occur in practice? The answer is yes if one is prepared to go beyond the text book. Few examples are in order. Corner solutions refer to the situation wherein the consumer is happy when he has all of one good and none of the other. He either wants all of it or none at all. Take the example of Mahabharata. Pandavas and Kauravas fight for the land of Hastinapura.   Bheeshma’s solution of division of the territory did not solve the matters but postponed it. The game of dice and Pandava’s consequent exile resulted in Duryodhana ruling over the Indraprastha hitherto ruled by the Pandavas.   Post their return from exile, there were multiple options. The whole kingdom could go either to Pandavas or to Kauravas or a division could happen which could allot varying proportions to the both the parties. Bheeshma’s formula r