Decision Making as Output and Bounded Rationality

  The classical economics theories proceed on the assumption of rational agents. Rationality implies the economic agents undertake actions or exercise choices based on the cost-benefit analysis they undertake. The assumption further posits that there exists no information asymmetry and thus the agent is aware of all the costs and benefits associated with the choice he or she has exercised. The behavioral school contested the decision stating the decisions in practice are often irrational. Implied there is a continuous departure from rationality. Rationality in the views of the behavioral school is more an exception to the norm rather a rule. The past posts have discussed the limitations of this view by the behavioral school. Economics has often posited rationality in the context in which the choices are exercised rather than theoretical abstract view of rational action. Rational action in theory seems to be grounded in zero restraint situation yet in practice, there are numerous restra

Corner or convex solutions –Mahabharata to Jinnah to Anna Hazare



Indifference analysis enables locating the optimal consumption bundle of typical consumer. Corner solutions are exception to law of equi-marginal utility. But do they occur in practice? The answer is yes if one is prepared to go beyond the text book. Few examples are in order.

Corner solutions refer to the situation wherein the consumer is happy when he has all of one good and none of the other. He either wants all of it or none at all. Take the example of Mahabharata. Pandavas and Kauravas fight for the land of Hastinapura.  Bheeshma’s solution of division of the territory did not solve the matters but postponed it. The game of dice and Pandava’s consequent exile resulted in Duryodhana ruling over the Indraprastha hitherto ruled by the Pandavas.  Post their return from exile, there were multiple options. The whole kingdom could go either to Pandavas or to Kauravas or a division could happen which could allot varying proportions to the both the parties. Bheeshma’s formula resulted in precisely the same earlier and was acceptable for Pandavas and the restoration of that formula was their demand. Duryodhana preferred extreme solutions and wanted either the whole of the kingdom or none of it. He preferred in economic terms ‘the corner solution’.

Similary we find Hitler adopting similar corner solutions in the run up to World War II and during the course of the battle. Jinnah’s insistence on Pakistan or civil war, in economic jargon again refers to corner solution preference as against more moderate options. In the run up to independence as the divisions widened between the Congress and Jinnah, many solutions could be suggested. Decentralized governance with strong autonomy to the states etc were being considered as convex options. The extreme options were civil war leading to elimination of either Jinnah or the Congress but unity would be preserved with strong center akin to the present system of governance in India versus the partition of the country as what eventually happened. In Jinnah’s terminology, convex solutions probably never found a place. In his negotiations it was only two options, civil war or partition were floated. He preferred partition and got it. Either the whole of it or none of it. 

Anna Hazare’s stand during the height of LokPal agitations pressing for their version of the Bill (My-Way or Highway) again illustrates the stress on corner solutions.



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