Decision Making as Output and Bounded Rationality

  The classical economics theories proceed on the assumption of rational agents. Rationality implies the economic agents undertake actions or exercise choices based on the cost-benefit analysis they undertake. The assumption further posits that there exists no information asymmetry and thus the agent is aware of all the costs and benefits associated with the choice he or she has exercised. The behavioral school contested the decision stating the decisions in practice are often irrational. Implied there is a continuous departure from rationality. Rationality in the views of the behavioral school is more an exception to the norm rather a rule. The past posts have discussed the limitations of this view by the behavioral school. Economics has often posited rationality in the context in which the choices are exercised rather than theoretical abstract view of rational action. Rational action in theory seems to be grounded in zero restraint situation yet in practice, there are numerous restra

Intellectual Property Differentials Across Industries

 

The debate on intellectual property rights (IPRs) at the global level seems to rest primarily on a single size fits all model. The US driven agenda to enforce stricter norms for IP across countries is ostensibly an attempt to push the US agenda. Now that the incoming US administration led by President Biden is likely to revive TPP, it is possible that IP issues might come to the fore yet again. However, while examining the empirical realities, the IP practices vary from industry to industry. Rarely there exists an industry which has an uniform IP practice relative to other industries. It must beg to be explained why the differentials in IP exists across industries.

In an earlier paper, one had discussed at certain length on how IP differentials could be linked to interplay between costs and utility. In economics, firms strive for profit maximization while consumers seek maximization of utility. The interplay between the two can be analysed through an examination of the firm’s cost structure as against the utility derivation from the consumers. Firms with high costs but price elastic might demonstrate different perspectives as against firms with low fixed costs. As one examines the costs, higher fixed costs signify the essence of economies of scale.  Consumer utility maximization is premised on the existence of income constraints and the presence of diminishing marginal utility. The following table posits the juxtaposition of the two factors.

IPRs and Industries- Utility Cost Analysis

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Source: Prashant Kulkarni, Towards Locating Market Failure as an Outcome of Intellectual Property Regime:  Mapping the IPR-Market-Society Interfaces (2013)

 

When one examines the above matrix and looks at the evidence from the field, an interesting patterns emerge. Those industries which tend to have high variable costs are relatively lax in enforcing certain types of IPRs. For instance, fashion and accessories industries emphasize on trade-marks and are not so obsessed with the patents or copyrights. Derivative reworking of fashion designs is not uncommon. In fact, there is a tacit encouragement towards the same despite some public protestations. Apparently, the presence of knock-offs do not affect the industry revenues as evident from their reactions in contrast let us say to the entertainment industry. This perhaps has to do not just with nature of costs but with the nature of consumer utility that exists in the industry. The fashion trends fade off fast. The marginal utility seems to diminish and the differentiation element wears off fast. Technological interventions are not possible. The only differentiator is the brand and therefore they are obsessed with brands and trade-marks and not with copyrights. The firms know their users seek the brand and the associated signals it indicates, an indicator of Veblen good. Therefore, their emphasis on the trademarks and not copyrights. They perhaps would not mind seeking induced obsolescence thus allowance for fresh designs each year.

 

Yet as one examines the entertainment industry, it seems the other way round. They do experience a short product cycle accompanied by faster diminishing utilities. They too need fresh investment each season. Piracy levels are similar to those present in the fashion industry. Yet the response to piracy by the entertainment industry is completely in contrast to the fashion industry. While at one level, the fashion industry seems oblivious to the phenomenon of piracy, entertainment industry in particular seems to take Broken Windows model very seriously and goes after the smallest of the violators. The answers perhaps lie in the cost structure. The cost structure in the entertainment industry is strongly geared towards the fixed costs. The industry exhibits high degree of instantiation. It is an industry that can be digitalized cent per cent in contrast to the fashion industry which is physical. Replication costs in the entertainment industry are close to zero. Branding while being an important differentiator is not the sole determinant. The availability of substitutes and the people’s motivations to try out entertainment goods differ considerably. Therefore, the industry demonstrates its attitudes towards the pirates very differently and thus obsessed with copyrights.

 

In the pharmaceutical industry, Broken Windows does make them go hard after the alleged violators but often find themselves struggling against national sovereignty the very reason they came up with global patent regime in the Uruguay round of international trade negotiations. While they have high fixed costs, the availability of substitutes do not exist in a similar manner like the entertainment industry. They too exhibit instantiation properties yet, the marginal utility remains relatively higher for considerable period of time. The product cycles are not short. They have high fixed costs and marginal utility does not diminish fast. This perhaps explains why they seek patents which confer a monopoly for a longer period. They seek to control on the flow of duplicates if one might have to call it.

 

The high variable costs and low diminishing marginal utility perhaps does not have too many examples and they perhaps are not relevant in the debate on IP. In the matrix illustrated above, there is no doubt presence of industries that do not fit in the above explanations. Automobile industry does experience a high fixed cost accompanied by lower levels of marginal utility but perhaps what changes the dimension is the reproduction costs. It is not easy to replicate a car as opposed to let us say pharmaceutical drugs or movies or music. Therefore, economies of scale is essential for reproduction too thus these costs might come in the way of their application of IP rules and the consequent enforcement of the same. Furthermore, they might be subject to holdouts in their build up to the launch of the vehicle and thus might get reflected in their own attitude towards IP enforcement. Each industry has it own set of motivations towards enforcement of IPRs. The current post seeks to build on the past research and try and seek explanation what could account for those differentials. This is perhaps the beginning of the research discussion and questions being framed. It needs to be built up and expanded to account for other factors too. 



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