One happened to
see an interesting article in the Indian Express by veteran strategic affairs
expert C. Raja Mohan. The article is available here.
The article highlights the Indian confusion over alliances in the backdrop of
the meeting of the Quad foreign ministers in Tokyo. Currently, the Quad is more
of an informal alliance between US, Japan, India and Australia ostensibly to
counter China. Yet so far, there is no indication of it being institutionalised
or morphing into some kind of new NATO. Yet, in the Indian strategic affairs
community, the Great Indian Alliance Confusion is well underway. Rather than
any confusion, it is about the reluctance to accept the changed state of
affairs and the need to abandon certain dogmas. The refusal to abandon
self-perpetuated dogmas might well prove to be India’s Achilles heel. It would
therefore be pertinent to decode Indian foreign policy and its stance over
alliance formation with different countries.
The problem with
India forming alliances with one party or the other has to do with the global
background that existed when India became independent in 1947. Alliances are
nothing new. They are perhaps as old as the human mankind. At every different
level, there are alliances that are formed whether they are long term or
contextual. The marital alliances that were formed during the reign of various
empires acts as a testimony to the same. Both the epics Ramayana and Mahabharata
point towards the alliances that were formed by various rulers at different
points of time. Subhash Chandra Bose tying with Imperial Japan to oust the
British from India too was an example of an alliance. Yet, the Nehruvian
foreign policy evolved in certain circumstances that made the word alliance
perhaps unworthy especially if it involved anything with the West.
US, Britain,
French government in exile and the Soviet Union formed an alliance that
popularly made them being termed Allies in the Second World War to defeat the
Axis powers of Germany, Japan and Italy. Yet this alliance was short lived to
the context of the war and defeat of the Axis. The moment Axis was defeated, a
new Cold War emerged. In fact, the Cold War had begun evolving even during the
Great War. While the Soviets believed their system was superior, the Americans believed
that their system was superior in all aspects. The race was not merely in terms
of military superiority but spilled over to the technology race as exemplified
in the race to the space, to the moon, to discoveries in scientific world. The
race spilled over the farms with competition for producing, distributing and
consuming of food grains. It spilled over into the race for political systems,
economic systems, social systems. In this race for superiority of ideology, the
countries were expected to tie up with either of them. The context provided the
framework for the rise of NATO, Warsaw Pact, European Community, COMECON,
CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS among many others. It was in this global backdrop that
India decided not to opt for either alliances and instead stay non-aligned. Non
alignment was perhaps a mirage yet India was engaged in sort of balancing
activity. The non-alignment turned into a Non-Aligned Movement and thus a lobby
or an alliance of sorts is a story in itself. Yet while seeking to maintain
equi-distance from both US and Soviet Union India could not shake off alliance.
The Bandung conference, a forerunner to NAM itself was an attempt to create an
alliance of newly independent countries in Asia-Pacific and Africa. In 1962, facing
the humiliating defeat at the hands of China, India turned to US for help which
it did come but for varying reasons. Through the first two decades of independence,
India begged US and the West for food, in some ways cementing a relationship of
patron and patronized. In the run up to the 1971 War, India entered into an
treaty with the Soviet Union that helped it cushion the Western pressure in the
1971 war. India’s reaction to Vietnam was more of an implicit support to the
Soviet stand, something seen before in Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and
later Afghanistan in 1980.
India’s perceived
softness towards the Soviet Union often was projected in the West as being an
unreliable ally and thus the Western investment in Pakistan. In India, the
colonial hangover continued to last and thus the West was by and large painted
as imperialist, colonial powers that have to be confronted with. India’s
softness towards France which too was no less an empire builder was apparently
due to the frequent antagonism between Britain and France. It was dictum of
other’s enemy being a friend. Any move towards a détente with the US was seen
as a sell-out and perhaps politically costly in the Indian milieu. Therefore,
India’s approach towards US for a greater engagement in the recent past have
been met with mixed responses.
India has been
clear of not having any formal alliance with the US but there have been many
steps that point towards operationalization of alliances at a tactical or an
operational level. Similar measures have been taken with Japan, Australia and
other countries. India’s current approach seems to be pointing towards building
a coalition without sacrifice of any strategic independence against China. It
is interesting while India has been taking steps to strengthen Quad or JAI with
US and Japan, India has also been actively involved in BRICS or RIC or SCO
where Russia and China are key players. In seeking to balance with multiple
powers, India does not want to break the relationships with other countries. The
new jargon seems to be multi-alignment. India wants to the keep bridges open
with China too. Yet India must realise that China will not accommodate India at
any level except as its subsidiary. China follows the paradigm of no two lions
in a single jungle despite the possibility of co-existence. In such a scenario,
India will be pushed down. The current round of stand-off is essentially
seeking to reiterate the above stand. Similar attempts are being against Japan
too. Therefore India must plan for the alliances to counter China and take an aggressive
stance shedding all inhibitions. The more sooner India shed its inhibitions and
take an outright public stance against China abandoning the Nehruvian
ambivalence in some ways will be better for India.
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