Decision Making as Output and Bounded Rationality

  The classical economics theories proceed on the assumption of rational agents. Rationality implies the economic agents undertake actions or exercise choices based on the cost-benefit analysis they undertake. The assumption further posits that there exists no information asymmetry and thus the agent is aware of all the costs and benefits associated with the choice he or she has exercised. The behavioral school contested the decision stating the decisions in practice are often irrational. Implied there is a continuous departure from rationality. Rationality in the views of the behavioral school is more an exception to the norm rather a rule. The past posts have discussed the limitations of this view by the behavioral school. Economics has often posited rationality in the context in which the choices are exercised rather than theoretical abstract view of rational action. Rational action in theory seems to be grounded in zero restraint situation yet in practice, there are numerous restra

Presumptive Loss and Price Discrimination

 

The Delhi High Court is hearing the appeals of the Union of India against the acquittal of all the accused in the notorious 2G scam case. Among those in the dock are DMK leaders like Kanimozhi and A. Raja the then Union Minister. The hearings on these appeals are likely to get over by early November with the judgment likely to be out by the end of this year. The political ramifications of the judgment would no doubt be felt. Given the approaching elections to the legislative assembly in Tamil Nadu, the opposition DMK would sitting on razor’s edge awaiting the judgment. In some ways, if the accused are convicted, this could have certain implications for the succession planning within the DMK. DMK might be in an advantageous position going into the elections, but an adverse judgment might derail its plans. Incidentally in some quarters, the current hearings are being viewed in the context of the hard bargaining that might be going on between the DMK leadership and the ruling BJP at the centre. While the BJP was in alliance with the AIADMK in the Lok Sabha elections last year, politics is of course the art of uncertainties.

 

Yet, this scam goes beyond the political ramifications. The scam attained notoriety when the then CAG Vinod Rai claimed a loss of Rs. 1.76  lakh crores. The Supreme Court judgment cancelling the allotment of licenses is one of the direct causes of the telecom woes that exist today. There were certain judicial overreaches both in 2G as also in the coal scam cases. The economic recovery has been impacted by these cases indirectly. Because the licenses were cancelled, the firms could not generate the revenues. Yet the money they spent in acquiring the license was not given back. This meant they could not pay the loans they had accumulated resulting in the build-up of non-performing assets (NPAs) in the banks. This hindered further lending. Meanwhile, the firms saddled with debt could not plan for fresh investment neither could generate fresh loans in the absence of repayment of past loans. In many ways, the roots of this crisis lie in Vinod Rai’s assessment of the presumptive loss. In this context, it would be relevant to discuss and decode what presumptive loss actually means.

 

Towards understanding presumptive loss, one needs to understand pricing theory in economics. Economics posits pricing to be contingent on the willingness to pay. The maximum price an agent is willing to pay for a resource is called the buyer reservation price. Similarly there is a reservation price from the seller’s perspective which is the minimum price the producer is willing to sell. To any agent on either side, understanding the reservation price of the other party is paramount. There actually would be a bargain which would result in the final price being settled. The difference between the reservation price and the price at which it was actually purchased is called the consumer surplus. Similarly from the seller’s perspective, the difference between the price at which it was actually sold and the seller reservation price is called the producer surplus. The buyers would like to appropriate the entire of producer surplus while the seller would seek to appropriate the entire consumer surplus. All their strategies are in pursuit of the capture of this surplus. There are multiple ways of capturing this surplus which is captured in economics as theory of price discrimination. Price discrimination can be perfect wherein it is possible to identify each agent’s surplus, can be through self-selection wherein the agent is made to reveal through his or her actions their consumer or producer surplus and finally the group discrimination wherein the group surplus is sought to be identified or approximated.

 

This is where the entire dynamics of the 2G scam begins. As with any other resource, the government would allot spectrum for telecom firms to offer 2G network. It might look little odd and archaic to talk about 2G when the whole world is debating 5G and beyond, the world was very different hardly a decade and half ago. The telecom firms would have calculated certain revenue streams from 2G networks. They would have anticipated certain growth in the 2G system and the prospects of the next generation spectrum emerging. While 3G and 4G would have been the talk of the town as futuristic, the telecom firms had bid on acquiring these licenses for 2G. The government meanwhile was the custodian of the resource, the 2G spectrum. They too were calculating the prospective willingness of the telecom players to bid for the spectrum. There are many ways of allocating the resources so that the economic surplus is maximised. The methods could be auctions, first cum first served, lots or other things. The government of the day decided on a certain mechanism and allotted the spectrum to the selected players at the certain price. The question that arose out of this transaction was whether the government could have earned more from the transaction. While this would be a matter of debate, the corollary could be was the government interested in appropriating the consumer surplus. The question was whether the government was deliberately under-pricing the resources. If it was under-pricing, what was the quantum that was being under-priced became the next question. The audit of CAG took cognizance of this question and began calculating the figures.

 

The figures took into account what would have been their willingness to pay. The willingness to pay would have been contingent on their valuations. The valuations of course would depend on the free cash flows they anticipate in the coming years. Since the accounting expenses allow for factoring spreading out the expenses incurred setting it out against the future revenues, this would have been easy. Based on this calculations, the CAG arrived at a figure for their reservation price. There was something that they actually paid. The difference was the consumer surplus. While in normal course, this would not have been an issue, the question that whether government deliberately sold it at lower prices made this amount of consumer surplus relevant. In normal circumstances, even if the license fee was not set at the reservation price, the CAG felt that the government could have appropriated some more consumer surplus. The gap between the price at which it should have been licensed and the price at which it was actually licensed is termed the presumptive loss. It is the loss of producer surplus owing the government allegedly favouring certain parties to get the spectrum at the lower prices. Thus the economics angle of surplus becomes critical to understand this presumptive loss theory.

 

 

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