Decision Making as Output and Bounded Rationality

  The classical economics theories proceed on the assumption of rational agents. Rationality implies the economic agents undertake actions or exercise choices based on the cost-benefit analysis they undertake. The assumption further posits that there exists no information asymmetry and thus the agent is aware of all the costs and benefits associated with the choice he or she has exercised. The behavioral school contested the decision stating the decisions in practice are often irrational. Implied there is a continuous departure from rationality. Rationality in the views of the behavioral school is more an exception to the norm rather a rule. The past posts have discussed the limitations of this view by the behavioral school. Economics has often posited rationality in the context in which the choices are exercised rather than theoretical abstract view of rational action. Rational action in theory seems to be grounded in zero restraint situation yet in practice, there are numerous restra

Economics Applications- Examples from Intellectual Property Rights

 

Many past posts have discussed the applications of economics concepts and principles in different facets of life. It has been argued often that the applications are perhaps sub conscious but nevertheless can be theorized. There are often applications that can be theorised through economic thinking while rationalising those actions. The current post will seek to delve into the intellectual property rights (IPRs) and how their application gets rooted in economics. While IPRs need an engagement at depth, the current post will limit to a few examples that highlight the economics at work.

 

Ever-greening of patents

In 2014, the Supreme Court of India invalidated the patent on Gilvea, the anti-cancer drug developed and marketed by Novartis. The patent on the drug had expired in 2006 but the pharma giant wanted to extend the patent. It had made use of the application of the concept of ever-greening. Patents are an outcome of a trade-off between short term and long term prospective rewards. An off patent product would result in numerous spill-overs yet would be apparently detrimental to innovation. This is due to the innovators not getting the adequate rewards while benefiting the free-riders given the instantiation involved in production of drugs and related products. Yet a strong patent regime would possibly result in the tragedy of anti-commons thus susceptible to under-production of the drug. Hence there has to be a fair balance between the short term rewards for the innovators and the long term benefits to the society. The patent thus is usually granted for a period of fifteen years. To the drug firms however, they desire to extend their monopoly further. Therefore they resort to a tactic called ever-greening. They make cosmetic changes to the drug, for instance, a drug that is injected is released as a tablet or a solution. The firms go on to claim patent on these new forms of delivery claiming them as new products. Gilver case was essentially involved a cosmetic change in delivery form. The Supreme Court in the instant case held that for ever-greening, there must be a perceptible change or innovation and mere cosmetic changes are not valid for patent to be extended.

 

The ever-greening is essentially a tool to erect a permanent barrier of entry. Once the drug goes off patent, numerous firms can produce the drug resulting in the emergence of competition that might be relatively speaking closer to perfect. This potentially wipes out the opportunity for earning supernormal profits that sustain the drug firms during the period of their monopoly. The firms would not want to cede the market and hence try these tactics.

 

Compulsory licensing

 

Talking of supernormal profits, there is of course a possibility that firm given its market structure would like to appropriate the whole of consumer surplus. This might lead to scenario wherein large sections of population are unable to access the drugs. This is not unusual. This has been the story of anti-HIV drugs in many parts of Africa. While HIV is chronic disease that can be managed in the West, it is a killer disease in many parts of Africa, the only reason being the lack of access to drugs on grounds of non-affordability. This is something that is of concern as firms race with each other to produce the first vaccine against the virus unleashed by China. If the firms engaged in development of vaccine enforce their patents and refuse to allow its production by other firms, then the goal of universal vaccination might be in peril. Therefore it would be pertinent to understand what options government has.

 

While the firms can engage in first degree or second degree of price discrimination, the markets might not become the best way to resolve the societal needs. The government intervention at times might stabilize the market. If there is a market failure on account of inability to intersect the demand and supply points, the government can step in to allocate the resources. They have a tool called compulsory licensing. While there have been uses, though rarely and of course with generation of rancour, the solution to the COVID crisis perhaps lies in compulsory licensing of the vaccine. There are indications that some firms like Moderna have announced their indication not to enforce the vaccine, it might not be true for the all the firms.

 

Under compulsory licensing, the government will put all the patents associated with the production of the vaccine under a common pool. Any producer who wants to manufacture the vaccine can dip into the pool, use the products and pay a fixed royalty, the proceeds of which will go the firm whose drug is being produced. This would be a tool to avoid the anti-commons problem in vaccine development and production. In fact, it is not just about production, but even the vaccine manufacturers may need to avail patents of different agents to develop and produce that vaccine. So compulsory licensing might be a boon for those vaccine developers too. In normal times, it is not unusual for many drugs to remain in the labs since they cannot produce as the patent holder of one of the ingredients has refused to part with the patent or has demanded very high prices well above the consumer surplus.

 

It might be a different matter given the bargaining power of the government and the firms and the volumes that are required to vaccinate universally, the invocation of compulsory licensing might not happen. The firms themselves might want to hunt for partners who have the production capacity to cater to the demands of the large section of the population. Further, the generosity of the firms in not enforcing the patents might sound socially responsible thus giving them few brownie points. However, it is in their self-interest that they would not enforce patents rather than a manifestation of their concern for global wellbeing in health.

 

The two examples serve as manifestations on how economics becomes foundational in building up the applications for intellectual property rights. Essentially they seek to create barriers of entry and the mechanism to circumvent the barriers of entry. Some more examples would be taken up for discussion in the subsequent posts.

 

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