A 2013 post “Deciphering
the Strategic Logic of Electoral Alliances” discussed in substance the
theoretical underpinnings of a political party choosing to go for in for
electoral alliances for short term gains. There are push factors and pull
factors that come into play. These were sought to be analysed through the prism
of management theories how needs of both the national party eager into an alliance
and the regional political force which too would be equally keen to enter into
an alliance. To a political party making a headway in a state is always going
to be difficult. It would be easier to make the first wave of gaining let us
say around 10-15% of the vote in a wave election or so but would rather be long
climb with returns operating at a decreasing scale till it hits around 35-40%
wherein the party is in a position to have a strike at the government
formation. These long years which yield sub optimal returns are difficult to
keep the party workers motivated. Similarly to regional parties, they might be
comfortable in their state but would have national aspirations in which they
see a partnership of national party valuable. Further as the NDA-1
demonstrated, many were regional parties that had just making their entry as a
political force. They were new entities carved out of existing forces and thus
needed some support from established national party which made it a win-win for
all the parties.
To a political
party, there exists a desire to capture power both at centre and the states. Yet,
they are confronted with trade-offs. As they morph into national parties, they
have to trade-off some of their identity that has states or regional issues anchored
into it. An obsessive focus with the regional issues might imperil in
transformation to national domain thus opting for a relatively risk Free State
party status. Thus it is essentially a cost benefit analysis that drives a
political decision whether to expand nationally or keep the focus into a
specific state or two. At certain other level, many regional parties are
personality driven. In an endeavour to transform into national force either the
leader has to sacrifice regional ambitions and focus on parliamentary career
where they might have to spend decades in opposition. In fact, for the first
forty odd years of Indian polity, each party took care to project itself as
national party and not be bounded to regional confines. It was first success of
DMK in 1960s and 70’s followed by AIADMK and later the rise of TDP in the 1980s
that began the rise of the regional parties. They achieved a critical mass
around late 1990s but late 2000’s or early to mid-2010s they began to losing
their bargaining power. The rise of the Modi dispensation with back to back
absolute majority governments have eroded the power play of the regional or sub
regional forces at the centre.
To the BJP, in
the pre-2014 years, there used to be description in the political circles. The BJP
would have to depend on the North West Monsoon for a good harvest in seats
since there would obviously be the South East drought especially the KBOATT
problem referring to the eastern and southern states wherein BJP was hardly
expected to gain less than handful seats. The Modi wave has enabled BJP
consolidate itself in North-East, Bengal and Orissa with friendly regional
parties in Telangana, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. Only Kerala seems
the frontier where BJP cannot make a headway either directly or through the
help of regional allies.
To the BJP as it
plans to capture power in the states where it is a marginal player so far, the
current plans seem to be indicative of something described below. Orissa does
not seem to be on their priority list to capture power in the state. There are
friendly relations between ruling BJD and BJP and thus the fight is more of a
symbolic one. CM Naveen Patnaik enjoys significant popularity and his equation
with PM Modi has been very good. Therefore it is unlikely there would be
attempts to dislodge him. It would be more of an arrangement wherein both
parties might share seats in parliament with BJD having comfortable majority
and BJP as the opposition in the state assembly. The Congress, both would
desire to be confined to the fringes of state politics.
West Bengal is
witnessing a churning something that would determine CM Mamta’s fate in the
next year’s elections. BJP had captured around 16% vote in 1991 but then it
lost its way and it was only in 2014 that it began reattempting to conquer
fortress Bengal. Of course, a discussion on Bengal needs an elaborate
discussion. Likewise Kerala remains a final frontier. The dynamics of Kerala
are very different and need a separate treatment that is not possible in the
current piece. Karnataka was won due to multiple factors, inherent RSS base,
latent support to Hindu cause, hard work by regional leaders like BSY, Anantha
Kumar among others, co-opting of many a leader from the other regional or
national parties to strengthen the local base, Karnataka’s tendency to vote
towards national parties all made it possible for the party to make significant
headway into the state.
BJP had tasted
success in 1991 elections in Andhra winning a Lok Sabha seat. In 1998, the
party won four seats and around 20% of the vote. Yet the short term trade offs
of securing TDP support to the central government made it sacrifice Andhra in
many ways. The TDP opposition to separate Telangana cost BJP even bigger in
2004 elections. BJP made some significant headway in 2019 Lok Sabha elections
in Telangana but the current parliamentary legislative business makes its
necessary to secure KCR support. Hence BJP might be soft on him. Moreover there
are no immediate elections in the offing. Any activity is likely to start only
at end ’22. Something similar might happen in Andhra too. Currently all parties
in the state are conveying friendly postures to the BJP which makes it
relatively easier for the party to frame its strategies. Yet in all
probability, BJP will seek to make headway in the 2024 election cycle in these
twin states.
BJP needs to
bring in political leaders who command some base at the grassroots in Tamil
Nadu. They need leaders or workers who mobilize booth level workers. Unless the
party has presence in the booths across all constituencies, it is difficult to
penetrate the state. The social media might be betting on IPS officer Annamalai
who has joined the party recently, but he is unlikely to gain any traction
beyond some attention and at a lesser level interest. It needs to poach big to
make any headway. However, Tamil Nadu analysis too requires a separate engagement.
The piece is
more a bird’s eye overview on the possible strategies by the BJP to make
headway into the southern and eastern states. North East is a region where they
are already in power directly or as part of coalition. Each state is unique in
its own way and needs detailed engagement at length in the near future.
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