Decision Making as Output and Bounded Rationality

  The classical economics theories proceed on the assumption of rational agents. Rationality implies the economic agents undertake actions or exercise choices based on the cost-benefit analysis they undertake. The assumption further posits that there exists no information asymmetry and thus the agent is aware of all the costs and benefits associated with the choice he or she has exercised. The behavioral school contested the decision stating the decisions in practice are often irrational. Implied there is a continuous departure from rationality. Rationality in the views of the behavioral school is more an exception to the norm rather a rule. The past posts have discussed the limitations of this view by the behavioral school. Economics has often posited rationality in the context in which the choices are exercised rather than theoretical abstract view of rational action. Rational action in theory seems to be grounded in zero restraint situation yet in practice, there are numerous restra

The Economic Construction of Corruption

One word that makes one take notice is corruption. People are, at least in theory, seemingly opposed to corrupt practices and project a need for honesty. While there would be little dispute or rather undisputed stated preference towards eliminating corruption or critical of corrupt, revealed preference often demonstrates otherwise. People may go hammer and tong on the corrupt, yet given an opportunity, they are unlikely to resist themselves from exercising what is termed corruption. People might tend to proclaim themselves honest and non-corrupt, yet a detailed analysis of their personal or professional lives might indicate otherwise. It is obvious that no one  wants to describe themselves as corrupt  but would engage in practices that can be deemed corrupt.

 

A story comes to the mind that was revealed by co-passenger in a train. He was describing principles imbibed by his father and father in law which shaped his views against corruption. He was against bribery and would not pay so no matter what the costs are. Yet there was an occasion when he had to get certain work done in government office. Presumptively it was not possible to do without resort to bribe. Apparently, perchance he happened to meet someone at that office. That gentlemen wanted certain work done from this office. So there was a quid pro quo of doing each other reciprocal favour. Thus it seemed that work was done without resort to bribery. However, for good or bad there was quid pro quo. It is not merely the cash bribe that matters in corruption but non-cash matters too. While in the instant case, it might have been a legitimate transaction happening thanks to accidental meeting of service provider and service requestor. However, if we were to define corrupt practices, this too would have counted one had the privileges been misused, consideration existing or not.

 

Before decoding further, it is germane to understand and define corruption. In the normal course of things, corrupt activities encompass bribery, graft, nepotism, cronyism, extortion, parochialism, influence peddling, and patronage among many others. An economic agent through his or her position has the power to influence things, the power to allocate resources and the agent does the same on extraneous factors rather than merit. Implied is a criteria that is to followed for allocation of resources is sacrificed at the altar of other considerations like money, network, position etc.

 

Corruption can be defined, to borrow from Transparency International, as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. To each agent, there is a power vested to allocate the resources. The resources allocated have to follow certain norms. The norms are relaxed on non-merit considerations with an apparent private gain in mind. The private gain can be monetary or non-monetary. It can be a quid pro quo or expectation of a future ‘reciprocal altruism’. It could also manifest as sheer need for demonstration of power. It can be framed by the personal equations of the two agents in question. It can hinge on the past equations of the agents, a different sort of reciprocity. It can exercise as a favour to their own family/network etc.

 

It would thus be interesting to analyse corruption in economic terms. Economics by its very definition concerns itself about allocation of scarce resources and the behaviour of the agents in the allocation of such resources. So the understanding of corruption in economic analysis would thus begin from this definition. What would make the behaviour of an agent manifest as corrupt practices? It further needs to examine the context in which corruption happens. There would be analysis of the relative power structures that exists between the contracting parties or agents. To analyse the same, the first step would be narrowing down the corruption into two classifiable forms.

 

First instance refers to wherein one is prevented to the rightful access to resources by an agent using the power of hold out. An example would be the customs refusing to clear the goods though every formality was completely and everything was in order. the ostensible reason could be the demand from the customs agent for a bribe before allowing the release. Similarly, the sub-registrar raising objections to registration of property being purchased though everything would be in order. Other instances could be the shop or a hotel being denied the renewal of license through objections sundry and all. Such instances come across as a first classification. To many small entrepreneurs, this is the daily hassle for claiming the rightful, they have to pay bribe or rather extortion money. The resource owner has the rightful access to the resource but prevented so from executing their rights.

 

The second classification emerges when the resources are transferred to an agent who doesn’t have the rightful ownership. Illegal mining licenses, illegal telecom licenses are good examples for the same. The resources are currently in control of agent, whose power and position enable them to transfer to others for the legitimate usage. But the power is misused for personal gain. A firm or government agency calls for applications for a job. Instead of merit, the recruitment board decides to adopt extraneous criteria to select a candidate who might not have the requisite merit. The criteria could be parochialism, nepotism or sheer bribery. The end objective is the same. Someone undeserving gets access to resources through wilful connivance of the economic agent. Most forms of corruption deal with the same. In fact, this form of corruption morphs at the government level into what is termed as regulatory capture.

 

The solution for the same thus lies in identifying the source and classification of corruption. In the former instance, perhaps making only bribe seeking as a crime and not bribe giving would bring out the corrupt practices to the fore. At the moment both the bribe taker and bribe giver are penalised. So the incentive shift to bribe giver to open out. There is also a disincentive for the bribe taker because there is no monitoring for cheating.  The latter category has to be handled differently. The bribe giver could be made penalized and not the bribe taker. The bribe taker might have an incentive to refuse bribes and bring out the bribe offers on play. Of course, there could be consequences, intended or unintended. The need for eliminating the scourge for corruption lies in identification before the solution is found.

 

 


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