Decision Making as Output and Bounded Rationality

  The classical economics theories proceed on the assumption of rational agents. Rationality implies the economic agents undertake actions or exercise choices based on the cost-benefit analysis they undertake. The assumption further posits that there exists no information asymmetry and thus the agent is aware of all the costs and benefits associated with the choice he or she has exercised. The behavioral school contested the decision stating the decisions in practice are often irrational. Implied there is a continuous departure from rationality. Rationality in the views of the behavioral school is more an exception to the norm rather a rule. The past posts have discussed the limitations of this view by the behavioral school. Economics has often posited rationality in the context in which the choices are exercised rather than theoretical abstract view of rational action. Rational action in theory seems to be grounded in zero restraint situation yet in practice, there are numerous restra

Self Interest, Lock-ins and Encyclopedia Britannica Story

 

Firms have a configuration of assets, resources and market positions which are often unique. They are something that cannot be translated into other contexts easily. Once a market position is obtained, it becomes difficult to reposition the firm. Similarly, the assets are configured to a certain market position and are aligned to work in pursuit of the interests of the market position thus obtained. This is precisely a reason why many firms fail to make the cut when faced with technological changes. There might be a strong innovation culture yet the ability to commercialize might be constrained because of the configuration of assets and resources. For instance, Xerox set up the Paolo Alto Research Centre (PARC) to work on the avante garde technology and did manage to do very impressive work in terms of technologies developed. Yet none of them could be commercialized by Xerox. In fact, while many technologies have gained significant traction in the market, they are hardly associated with Xerox. Incidentally, SMS developed in Nokia for internal communication yet as its successor flourish all over the world, they are anything but associated with Nokia.

 

Therefore one might wonder what would basically go against the innovation paradigm that forces the firm into a myopia often attributed to the founders or the marketing mix. Despite the marketing myopia problem suggested by Theodore Levitt, the problem does not disappear. Similarly, every founder grapples with what Tim Wu would call founder’s myopia. The example of Encyclopedia Britannica would be in order. For more than two hundred years, Britannica was the most authoritative of the encyclopedias. There was hardly any challenger to the same. Even to the present day, it must be argued when it comes to the authenticity and authority of information and as knowledge repository nobody comes closer to it. Wikipeda’s advantage has been the ease of access besides the swift mechanisms to edit any errors if discovered. The top down approach of Britannica prevented frequent corrections of errors.

 

Britannica’s success was attributed to the ground sales force which did extensive selling. The fact it lasted two hundred years was underscored by the fact, it generated lot of customers who bought it despite its price. To many, in the middle and developing world. Britannia was something to envied of, perhaps got a glimpse in book exhibitions or libraries, or in the book shelves of those neighbors or classmates who perhaps could afford to buy one such copy or so. Britannia believed its success to be the outcome of the authority in which it presented the information on almost everything in this world. There was hardly any repository that could match the depth and breadth in a world where richness and reach were subject to a terse unavoidable trade-offs.

 

In 1993, Microsoft began giving a CD of an encyclopedia Encarta as a free complement with purchase of personal computers. It was the beginning of the PC revolution and the Microsoft DOS and later Windows were the default the operating systems barring exceptions. The Bill Gates era seemed a perfect opportunity for Microsoft to leverage this market. Encarta was not something new. There was one encyclopedia Funk and Wagnalis whose non-exclusive rights were purchased by Microsoft. The softer version of the same morphed into Encarta. If compared in their print versions, Funk and Wagnalis was no match to Britannica. Yet as the softer version came on board, this seemed to have an impact on the sales of Britannica. Britannica found it difficult to understand why its sales were down and customers shifting to Encarta given the quality differentials. It too began to offer CD version of Britannica as a complement to print version. Yet it did not have any impact. The answers were surprising.

 

Contrary to perception, it was not for the authority and authenticity that people purchased Britannica but because it was good for their children. Essentially, the sales were output of an arm’s race among parents to secure something good or rather best for their children. Britannia was thus good and therefore has to be purchased just that in the 1990s, the arms race shifted to the personal computers. Computers were believed to be good for children and every parent decided to invest in the same for their kids setting off some arm’s race. In the arms race, Encarta was a complement and thus there was little need for the parents to reinvest in Britannica. Thus the PC became a substitute for Britannica causing the drop in the sales of the latter. The failure on the part of Britannica was due to the lock-in of resources and market positions in a certain configuration.

 

There were interests of the firms and there were interests of the sales team that was working on the ground. Over a period of time ranging into decades, the two interests had locked into each other. More precisely, the interests of the firm had got locked into the interests of the sales force on the ground. The firm’s interests would have been best served by securing the first mover advantage in the internet era that was just unfolding. Yet to the sales force, the incentive mechanism lay in the number of hard books sold. This would mean a death knell for their incentives in case of a shift online. They perhaps had sensed the shifts in people’s preferences but they chose to postpone the inevitable. They chose to delay it so as to maximize their incentives. Since the firm’s assets and resources were locked into the positions of the ground force, the firm could simply not gather the changing wind directions and adapt suitably.

 

There exists a differentials in the interests among the firms and the individual agents which does lead to misalignment and thus agency costs. Yet in this context, the agency costs were perhaps an outcome of the firm locking itself into its sales team and perhaps those agency costs turned into an existential crisis. In fact Encarta soon fell by the wayside replaced by Wikipedia which emerged from nowhere and in an accidental manner. The lesson that one gathers in the Britannica episode is not just about divergent interests leading to failure in achievement of collective welfare but the lock-in of interests that would fail the invisible hand within the firm.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Decision Making as Output and Bounded Rationality

The Chicken-Egg Conundrum of Economics

A Note on Supply-Demand Dynamics