Decision Making as Output and Bounded Rationality

  The classical economics theories proceed on the assumption of rational agents. Rationality implies the economic agents undertake actions or exercise choices based on the cost-benefit analysis they undertake. The assumption further posits that there exists no information asymmetry and thus the agent is aware of all the costs and benefits associated with the choice he or she has exercised. The behavioral school contested the decision stating the decisions in practice are often irrational. Implied there is a continuous departure from rationality. Rationality in the views of the behavioral school is more an exception to the norm rather a rule. The past posts have discussed the limitations of this view by the behavioral school. Economics has often posited rationality in the context in which the choices are exercised rather than theoretical abstract view of rational action. Rational action in theory seems to be grounded in zero restraint situation yet in practice, there are numerous restra

Measures of Market Power- A Primer

 

The recent US elections has brought to the fore the role of Big Tech. the Big Tech was unapologetic and unhesitating in its power to swing the vote balance towards Biden across the country. One might argue that it was the election management of Democrats in those crucial swing states that tilted the balance in a deeply divided country. Yet it cannot be denied that the Big Tech using its lock-in power on information is acting virtually as a supra-constitutional authority. However, the question that creeps into the mind is obviously how one is going to quantify this market power. It is easy in qualitative terms through a prism of perception to argue a certain firm is powerful or not. One can posit a certain power commands a significant power in deciding the narrative or pushing to the fore its profits or controlling significantly the dimension of prices. Despite this, it would be difficult to conceive market power in the absence of a quantitative measure. The current post surveys the various quantitative measures that exist and seek to measure market power.

 

It would be prudent to begin with the simplest one. This is of course the Concentration ratio. The concentration ratio measures the combined market share of the largest firms in a particular industry or a sector. It might be wise to question how one selects the industry or the sector but considerable literature has been devoted in classifying the industries and sectors. In fact, for macroeconomic measures, the government has come with classifications for various industries, sectors, sub-sectors etc. Therefore, it would not be difficult to classify the various industries though the definitions and the classifications often tend to become obsolete with the changing environment. For instance, Google is often considered as a technology firm whereas in reality it could be a firm that is more of space selling or information powerhouse or even a media firm. The same can go with let us say a social media platform like Twitter. Yet in short run, the classifications work and they get periodically reviewed across the globe. Second question would obviously be how many firms need to be counted or factored in for the measure. In practice, it is usually the combined market share of the four largest firms in the industry. Since four firms are taken, it is called as four firm concentration ratio. If the three largest firms were factored in, it would be termed as three firm concentration ratio.

 

The concentration ratio indicates the market share in combined terms of the largest firms in the industry. Higher the concentration ratio implies higher the market power thus the market assuming the characteristics of oligopoly. Higher three firm ratio indicates a strong possibility of movement towards monopoly. Yet the picture one obtains from concentration is misleading. If the four firm concentration ratio is 80, it indicates a high degree of oligopoly, yet when decomposed it might be that the largest firm would have 60% market share while the rest three have a combined market share of twenty percent. This indicates a strong degree of monopoly. Another case might wherein the three firm concentration ratio might be 75% yet each of those three firms might command a market share of twenty five percent each which implies a very highly competitive tripoly than something indicated in the aggregate picture. To overcome this, the usual practice is to take market shares of all firms in the market. These market shares are squared and the sum of these squares is taken as a measure of market power. In some context, the square root of these sum of squares is calculated. The squaring up of market shares of all firms eliminates distortions created by the concentration ratio as indicated above. In the two instances cited above the latter might yield a lower number relative to the former. Therefore this measure is more appropriate in seeking to quantify market power. This measure is called Herfindhal Index. In normal course, higher Herfindhal index points to greater market concentration while lower values indicate competitive markets. The figures usually range from 10 to 100 if the square root of the sum of squares is considered else it is between 100 and 10000.

 

While the above two measures seek to quantify the market power through an analysis of market shares, there is another method that seeks to measure market power through the pricing policy of the firm. This makes the competitors redundant. The argument is if the firm commands significant pricing power, it implies a strong market presence. The more competitive the market is, the less the control the firm has over the prices. In a perfectly competitive market, the firm does not have control over the price but only over the output. The prices are determined by the market and the firm acts as a price taker. Therefore, Lerner index seeks to measure this pricing power. One way to measure is to identify the reciprocal of own price elasticity of demand. This is obvious since if the good is elastic and the competitors are more, the firm is unlikely to price it high. The second measure talks about the price in relation to marginal cost. In a competitive market, the firm prices at its marginal cost. As the firm gains market power, it is likely to price above its marginal cost though the mathematical condition still remains marginal revenue equating marginal costs. The Lerner index therefore seeks in quantifying market power through the ratio of excess price over marginal costs to the price of the good or the service. It can be expressed as (P-MC)/P wherein P is the price of the good and MC is the marginal cost. Higher the ratio would imply higher the market power. The lower the ratio implies low market power. In a perfectly competitive world where firm has to price at its marginal cost, the Lerner index is zero. However, the difficulty lies in identifying accurately the marginal costs. This makes it difficult for use.

 

Normally to the competition authorities, it is the Herfindhal index that is of importance. Again, it is not the absolute measure that might be of importance but the changes in Herfindhal index that is used to understand the changing currents of the market structures and dominance. The current post has sought to give a broad primer on measures of market power. Sometime later on, the post would extend its discussion into the applied use of these measures through relevant case studies.

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