Decision Making as Output and Bounded Rationality

  The classical economics theories proceed on the assumption of rational agents. Rationality implies the economic agents undertake actions or exercise choices based on the cost-benefit analysis they undertake. The assumption further posits that there exists no information asymmetry and thus the agent is aware of all the costs and benefits associated with the choice he or she has exercised. The behavioral school contested the decision stating the decisions in practice are often irrational. Implied there is a continuous departure from rationality. Rationality in the views of the behavioral school is more an exception to the norm rather a rule. The past posts have discussed the limitations of this view by the behavioral school. Economics has often posited rationality in the context in which the choices are exercised rather than theoretical abstract view of rational action. Rational action in theory seems to be grounded in zero restraint situation yet in practice, there are numerous restra

Information Assymetry, Diya and Wuhan Virus


Economics assumes rational action by agents under perfect available information. Yet the cognitive constraints in gathering and processing information makes agents take decisions under uncertainty. Rationality thus is bounded by cognitive abilities of the agents. In real life, contrary to theory, bounded rationality is evident. It is not to suggest irrationality in decision making but each action by an economic agent is a rational action undertaken through a grasp of cost benefit dynamics under the existing constraints.

Information asymmetry between agents and among agents necessitate different approach to decision making. The buyer knows something about herself which the seller does not know. This could have significant implications in industries like insurance and banking. Suppose a person has a certain disability or disease while going for insurance which he or she can hide the same. Alternatively someone is going for fire insurance with a hidden objective of setting house or factory on fire to claim insurance money. An agent approaches bank for a loan with hidden intention of not repaying. The insurance and banking company does not know these things. Therefore the cherry and lemon problem leading to adverse selection is well known problem in economics.

Information asymmetry pervades many industries. A producer or seller has greater information about the product than the buyer. This in precise leads to the above described lemon and cherry problem. Information asymmetry is best sought to be circumvented through the theory of signalling. In economics agents convey signals either explicit or implicit. The counterparty agents have to grasp the signals to decode the same and thus strategize accordingly. Let us assume an economic agent purchases a car. The next day, she decides to sell the same. The car might be just a day old yet the price of the same as empirical research has proved will reduce by more than half. To any prospective buyer, the signal is the intention of the seller. They would be more than curious to understand why the seller wants to dispose of the car when he or she would have purchased it just a day before. Therefore it is implied that there must be something wrong with the car. The same would probably go with the house which is out for sale let us say within a month of purchase. Therefore the buyer accordingly changes her strategy and bids for far lower prices than they would be otherwise. Even though the sale might be on account of certain emergency reasons and nothing to do with the quality of the product, the very timing in the world of asymmetries would deter the buyers from paying the full price.

Signalling is something prevalent for instance in education industry wherein a decision to spend extra year in education conveys to the prospective employers about the agent’s keenness to gain certain extra skillsets. A Harvard graduate gets high salaries for the very reason of the barriers of entry that exist to enter into Harvard. If somebody has cracked the same, then there must be some stuff in the guy/gal. The same goes with the civil services exam in India. Despite criticism about the IAS officers etc. the very fact they cracked the exam among more than lakh or so who attempt it every year sends a signal that there is some material in the person who has cracked the exams.

Coming back to the current environment, there is uncertainty, possible despondency among the entire section of the society. There are frontline workers in healthcare, security forces and many others who are battling the pandemic of Chinese virus. With the Indian population under curfew virtually locked in home, there is very little between them to share information, share their problems, concerns and find solace in each other. The only mode of communication would be the social media tools but many are outside the realm of social media. There must exist a means of communication to express solidarity, to express their belongingness, to express their sense of concern among many other things. Therefore, on March 22, the day of the Janata curfew, an acoustical drill formed a part to express the support to all those directly or indirectly involved in the battle against the virus from Wuhan. In a long lockdown, there needs to be occasions of expressions to demonstrate each one is aware of the others efforts and concerns and are part of the cooperation in the battle to save humanity. The lighting of the diya is the expression of such an objective. ‘

Every agent can choose in theory to signal their support to the battle and express solidarity. Yet in the world where the flow of information is constrained, it might not lead to intended results. To borrow from James Suroweicki, the problem of collective signalling is one of co-ordination problem. There must be coordination in conveying a uniform signal to the intended audience that would be appropriate to the occasion and achieves the intended objectives of letting each one know that they are together in this difficult phase of life. Yet a coordination problem necessitates somebody taking the lead. Hence the nudge has to emerge from the top. Once a message comes from the Prime Minister, it gets a moral sanction and thus builds up a case for the bottom up coordination. Not that the bottom up actions of similar hue cannot come. Instances range from Italy to Spain to UK around that. Yet, aside of those, there needs to be a unifying moment for the whole country. The country and the society has to come together to signal the frontline force and to each other their own role, support and solidarity within the society.

As diyas are lit, mobile torches are shone, it sends a signal to each other that they might be physically distant, but socially and mentally together in handling the crisis. In the world of physical distancing, the signals reveal the intentions active or otherwise to each and every individual. It is just not the neighbouring buildings that get the message, it is just not the locality gets the message but the whole country gets a message. As the information is relayed through television and social media, the amplifying effect of the signal multiplies and gives a greater vigour to the battles that are uncertain in duration and outcome. While the outcome is certain of victory for human mankind, the costs of victory is what discourages and despairs most. Through a signal conveyed through shutting down of lights and lighting of diyas, it is simple message of all are together and sharing albeit implicitly or symbolically the sorrows and despair which each one finds themselves in.  Thus PM Modi’s message lies in the simple economic concept of signalling in an universe of uncertainty amplified by information asymmetry.


Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Decision Making as Output and Bounded Rationality

The Chicken-Egg Conundrum of Economics

A Note on Supply-Demand Dynamics