Decision Making as Output and Bounded Rationality

  The classical economics theories proceed on the assumption of rational agents. Rationality implies the economic agents undertake actions or exercise choices based on the cost-benefit analysis they undertake. The assumption further posits that there exists no information asymmetry and thus the agent is aware of all the costs and benefits associated with the choice he or she has exercised. The behavioral school contested the decision stating the decisions in practice are often irrational. Implied there is a continuous departure from rationality. Rationality in the views of the behavioral school is more an exception to the norm rather a rule. The past posts have discussed the limitations of this view by the behavioral school. Economics has often posited rationality in the context in which the choices are exercised rather than theoretical abstract view of rational action. Rational action in theory seems to be grounded in zero restraint situation yet in practice, there are numerous restra

A Note on Risk-Uncertainty Trade-offs


There is risk and there is uncertainty. Risk is about factoring a possible positive or adverse occurrence that changes the payoff and in addition there exists a positive probability of the occurrence of the event. Uncertainty is unknown risk. There would be no way of knowing an event happening and its consequent impact either discrete or continuous. Supply chain disruptions due to global wide pandemic with epicentre in the production hub might have a very low positive probability, yet the risk levels would be so low that they would not be factored in. Moreover, the multiplicative nature of the event creates an uncertainty which cannot be factored in. A question like will Olympics happen on schedule is simply not answerable given there is zero clarity on the future directions of the pandemic.

The directions of the multiplicative uncertain events often depend on individual motivations and risk assessments and their conflicting nature with the societal assessment and coping with the prospective ruin events. The post “Economics of Segregation” discussed the aggregate outcome as a product of independent exercise of individual preferences and in quite many ways would turn out very different from what an individual has set out to do.  These apply in the context of pandemics too.

To an individual, faced with the pandemic, the decision to be either conservative or demonstrate panic or remain indifferent is contingent on the risks he faces as an individual. Each individual is different and measures risks as applicable to them. Therefore their choices would be determined by cost benefit analysis of their individual payoffs or at best the payoffs to their immediate or extended family. To an individual who is otherwise healthy, the probability of the pandemic affecting him or her in a significant way is low and thus has all the motivations to play an indifferent or safe strategy and thus not take any action that might resemble a panicky situation. To an individual, who has perhaps higher risks from other ailments too, might not sufficiently demonstrate any measures to tackle the risk of the pandemic given the low probability of occurrence to the said individual or his/her immediate or extended family. Therefore a rational action per se might be playing down the dangers of the pandemic. This however holds well under ceteris paribus.

At the same time, the societal payoffs are different. To a society, a rational response would be to demonstrate an exaggerated response to take sufficient preventive measures to stop the spread or at least flatten the curve. The societal payoffs are contingent on the low spread or in the best case complete elimination of the pandemic. To an individual with low risk of contraction of the same, the immediate payoffs might not warrant the same. Yet, in demonstrating the supposed rational action of playing down the pandemic, the individual is behaving irrationally.

As the pandemic spreads, being inevitable if every individual plays down, the risk of contracting the pandemic increases with marginal patient. Therefore, to an individual, the payoffs change at every stage or for a marginal patient. In the infantile stage, there apparently is a conflict between individual payoffs and societal payoffs thus a differentials in grading of their choices. The conflicting choices create their own version of tragedy of commons. In the context of commons, it is the destruction of resources that leaves everyone worse off in the end at the altar of an individual pursuit to make himself or herself better off. Similarly, the seemingly rational innocuous choices catering to immediate payoff of an individual while antagonistic to societal needs might result in a similar tragedy where every individual ends worse off, the cost extending to loss of his or her life at worst or even in the best scenario some damage to health and thus productivity.

There exist an idiosyncratic risk inherent in each individual. The risk entails a short term low probability of being impacted by the disease thus entailing an exercise of certain choice. However, this short term risk is subject to trade off with long term risk and payoffs. As the pandemic spreads, the probability of contracting increases. In the long run, there is a movement towards convergence of idiosyncratic risk at individual level with the systemic risk at the societal level. In a context wherein an individual is spared of the worst excesses of the pandemic, there is a demonstration of what economists would term “income and substitution effect”. The costs of routine treatment or even alternate emergency becomes costlier relative to availability of resources to cater to the new pandemic. The individual interests become subordinate to societal interests in reference to provision of health care services.  Moreover, the uncertainties might result in numerous unintended spill overs mostly unpleasant that might override the individual short term idiosyncratic risk. Yet to many, the inability to compare the inter-temporal choices and the cognitive constraints in understanding and deciphering the inconsistency   and differentials in payoffs would push towards these actions.

In many ways, a solution to these dilemmas and trade-offs lie in the learning curve. When elders in the towns and villages would have lived long enough to see the tragic consequences of past epidemics, there would be coaxing or persuasion to adopt a different approach, perhaps panicky, perhaps over exaggerated. For instance, many elders would have observed the effects of contagion of small pox or plague or cholera etc. on the lives of the villages and towns. They through their wisdom would have gauged the possible side effects of ignoring precautions. So in many towns or villages some fifty odd years ago, whenever a team would come to vaccinate or inoculate for epidemics like small pox, plague, cholera among others, nobody in the village would seek to avoid it. On the contrary, they would seek to be the first to get vaccinated or inoculated. The availability heuristic manifested by the experiences narrated by the elders amplified the response. The result thus was the societal payoffs override the individual short term payoffs thus increasing societal welfare.




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